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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 920184-CA 
v. : Priority No. 3 
LESLIE C. ANDERSON, : 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a denial of a petition for post-
conviction relief. This Court has jurisdiction to hear the 
appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(g) (1992). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Did the trial court properly deny defendant's petition 
for a writ of extraordinary post-conviction relief? The issues 
raised by defendant in his petition present only questions of 
law, which this Court reviews for correctness with no deference 
to the trial court's conclusion. Stewart v. State, 830 P.2d 306, 
308-309 (Utah App. 1992). But see Bundv v. DeLand, 763 P.2d 803, 
805 (Utah 1988) ("On appeal from denial of habeas corpus relief, 
'we survey the record in the light most favorable to the findings 
and judgment; and we will not reverse if there is a reasonable 
basis therein to support the trial court's refusal to be 
convinced that the writ should be granted.") (citations omitted). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Any relevant text of constitutional provisions, 
statutes and rules pertinent to the resolution of the issues 
presented on appeal is contained in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with theft, a second degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-404 (1990) (R. 7-
9). On March 22, 1989, following a jury trial, defendant was 
found guilty as charged, and on March 28, 1989, the trial court 
sentenced defendant to an indeterminate term of 1 to 15 years in 
the Utah State Prison and ordered defendant to pay a fine of 
$2,000 (R. 106, 124-25, 132). 
Defendant filed a notice of appeal in this Court on 
April 11, 1989, arguing that he was denied due process and 
effective assistance of counsel (R. 137). On December 19, 1989, 
in an unpublished per curiam opinion, this Court ejected 
defendant's claims and affirmed his conviction (R. 152-153). 
State v. Anderson, No. 890218-CA (Utah App. Dec. 19, 1989). (A 
copy of the Court's opinion is attached hereto as Addendum A.) 
On or about February 25, 1992, nearly three years after 
his conviction and over two years after this Court affirmed his 
conviction on direct appeal, defendant filed what he called a 
"Motion for Modification of Judgment" in the Second Judicial 
District Court, in and for Davis County, State of Utah, advancing 
the same arguments he now makes before this Court (R. 159-74). 
The State filed a response to defendant's motion on February 26, 
2 
1992, arguing that defendant's motion was not properly before the 
court. The State noted that defendant's conviction already had 
been affirmed by the Utah Court of Appeals and asserted that, in 
any event, defendant's conviction was valid (R. 155-56). On 
February 27, 1992, Judge Douglas L. Cornaby denied defendant's 
motion to modify judgment and ruled that it was without merit (R. 
157). (A copy of the court's ruling is attached hereto as 
Addendum B.) Defendant now appeals from that order. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Given the nature of the claims advanced by defendant, 
and the procedural posture of this case, a detailed account of 
the facts is not necessary. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court properly denied defendant's petition 
for post-conviction relief because the claims advanced by 
defendant should have been raised on direct appeal. Even if this 
Court considers the merits of defendant's claims, it is clear 
that the trial court properly denied defendant's petition. A 
review of the record demonstrates that the jury was properly 
instructed on both the theft charge, for which defendant was 
convicted, and the lesser included offense of possession of a 
stolen vehicle. This Court should therefore affirm the trial 
court's denial of defendant's petition for post-conviction 
relief. 
3 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S 
PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF BECAUSE 
THE CLAIMS MADE BY DEFENDANT SHOULD HAVE BEEN 
RAISED ON DIRECT APPEAL. 
Although the trial court entitled its order "Ruling on 
Motion to Modify Judgment," the court treated defendant's motion 
as a petition for extraordinary post-conviction relief.l See 
State v. Workman, 806 P.2d 1198, 1202 (Utah App. 1991) (Utah 
appellate courts "look to the substance of the ruling and not to 
'the label attached . . . by the trial judge.'") (citation 
omitted). A review of the record, especially in light of the 
procedural posture of this case, demonstrates that the trial 
court properly denied defendant's petition. 
Defendant advances essentially two arguments. First, 
defendant claims that the jury was not properly instructed on the 
elements of the offense for which he was convicted. Second, 
defendant argues that Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1990) and § 41-
1-112 (Supp. 1991) prohibit the same conduct and that, pursuant 
to State v. Shondel, 453 P.2d 146 (Utah 1969), he should have 
been convicted of a third degree felony under § 41-1-1122 
1
 In 1991, rule 65B(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
(1992), replaced prior rule 65B(i). The new rule encompasses the 
previous "petition for writ of habeas corpus" procedure and more 
fully addresses post-conviction remedies under petitions for 
extraordinary relief. 
2
 At the time of defendant's conviction, possession of a 
stolen vehicle pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 41-1-112 was a third 
(continued...) 
4 
instead of being convicted of a second degree felony under § 76-
6-404• Both issues should have been raised on direct appeal and 
cannot be raised in a petition for post-conviction relief.3 
It is well-established that the extraordinary writ 
procedure provided for in rule 65B(b), Utah Rules of Civil 
Proceduref "is not a substitute for and cannot be used to perform 
the function of regular appellate review." Codianna v. Morris, 
660 P.2d 1101, 1104 (Utah 1983). Accord Bundv v. DeLand, 763 
P.2d 803, 804 (Utah 1988). Rather, the function of post-
conviction relief is 
to provide a means for collaterally attacking 
convictions when they are so constitutionally 
flawed that they result in fundamental 
unfairness and to provide for collateral 
attack of sentences not authorized by law. 
Hurst v. Cook, 777 P.2d 1029, 1034-35 (Utah 1989). 
For these reasons: 
It is therefore well settled in this state 
that allegations of error that could have 
been but were not raised on appeal from a 
criminal conviction cannot be raised by 
habeas corpus or postconviction review, 
except in unusual circumstances. 
Jensen v. DeLand, 795 P.2d 619, 620 (Utah 1989). While Utah 
2(...continued) 
degree felony. The legislature has since amended the provision 
to designate the offense a second degree felony. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 41-1-112 (Supp. 1991). 
3
 Although the trial court denied defendant's petition based 
on other grounds, this Court may affirm the trial court's ruling 
on any proper ground. State v. Bryan, 709 P.2d 257, 260 (Utah 
1985) (M[T]his Court may affirm the trial court's decision on any 
proper grounds, even though the trial court assigned another 
reason for its ruling."). 
5 
courts have found such "unusual circumstances" to exist where a 
defendant was unjustifiably denied an opportunity to raise an 
issue on direct appeal, Hurst v. Cook, 777 P„2d at 1035 
(collecting cases on "unusual circumstances"), the general rule 
of waiver remains. Dunn v. Cook, 791 P.2d 873, 879 (Utah 1990) 
(Zimmerman, J., concurring in result). 
In this case, the claims defendant now advances should 
have been raised on direct appeal. Defendant elected instead to 
argue that his trial counsel was ineffective and that he was 
denied due process. This Court considered and rejected 
defendant's appeal and should not now indulge defendant by 
providing him yet a second opportunity to litigate issues that 
should have been raised on direct appeal. On that basis alone, 
this Court should affirm the trial court's denial of defendant's 
petition. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S 
PETITION BECAUSE DEFENDANT'S CLAIMS THAT THE 
JURY WAS NOT PROPERLY INSTRUCTED AND THAT HE 
SHOULD HAVE BEEN SENTENCED FOR A LESSER 
INCLUDED OFFENSE ARE WITHOUT MERIT. 
Even if this Court were to consider the merits of 
defendant's claims, it is clear from the record that th€* trial 
court properly denied defendant's petition. This Court in 
Stewart v. State, 830 P.2d 306/ 309 (Utah App. 1992), stated: 
[T]he standard of review to be applied in 
reviewing a grant or denial of a petition for 
writ of habeas corpus varies depending on the 
issues raised on appeal. If the petition 
presents questions of law, we afford no 
deference to the trial court's conclusions. 
6 
If there are questions of fact, we defer to 
the trial courts findings and will disturb 
those findings only if they are clearly 
erroneous. 
Stewart, 830 P.2d at 309. But see Bundv, 763 P.2d at 805 ("On 
appeal from denial of habeas corpus relief, 'we survey the record 
in the light most favorable to the findings and judgment; and we 
will not reverse if there is a reasonable basis therein to 
support the trial court's refusal to be convinced that the writ 
should be granted.") (citations omitted). 
The present appeal involves only questions of law, 
which are reviewed for correctness. 
Defendant's first claim, that the jury was not 
instructed on the elements of theft under § 76-6-404, is without 
merit. As the district court noted in denying defendant's 
petition, 
Jury instruction number 11 specifically 
required that the jury find the defendant 
"Knowingly or intentionally" "obtained or 
exercised unauthorized control over an 
operable motor vehicle" and that the 
defendant "had a purpose to deprive Stephen 
Bown of said vehicle." 
(R. 157). Jury instruction number 11 parallels the language of 
SS 76-6-404 and 76-6-412(1)(a)(ii) and delineates every element 
of the offense (R. 86). (A copy of jury instruction number 11 is 
attached hereto as Addendum C.) Defendant's reliance on State v. 
Laine, 618 P.2d 33 (Utah 1980), is therefore misplaced. 
Defendant's second claim, that he should have been 
convicted of a third degree felony under § 41-1-112 instead of a 
second degree felony under SS 76-6-404 and 76-6-412(1)(a)(ii) 
7 
also lacks merit. The Utah Supreme Court made clear in State v. 
Larocco, 794 P.2d 460f 462-63 (Utah 1990), that possession of a 
stolen vehicle pursuant to § 41-1-112 was a lesser included 
offense of theft of a motor vehicle under SS 76-6-404 and 76-6-
412(1)(a)(ii).A In this case, the jury was properly instructed 
not only on theft of a motor vehicle, but also on the lesser 
included offense of possession of a stolen vehicle (R. 86, 87, 
89). Jury instruction number 14 specifically delineated the 
elements of possession of a stolen vehicle pursuant to § 41-1-
112, and the jury determined that defendant was instead guilty of 
theft. (A copy of jury instruction number 14 is attached hereto 
as Addendum D.) Because theft of a motor vehicle and possession 
of a stolen vehicle are separate offenses, and the jury was 
instructed on both offenses and determined that defendant was 
guilty of theft, defendant's Shondel argument was properly 
rejected by the trial court.5 
* Larocco. like this case, involved a conviction that was 
entered before the legislature amended § 41-1-112 to designate 
the offense of possession of a stolen vehicle a second degree 
felony. 
5
 Defendant also appears to advance a sort of equal 
protection argument by claiming that some of his fellow inmates 
who were convicted of the same offense received sentences of only 
zero to five years compared to his sentence of one to fifteen 
years. (Br. of App. at 8-10). However, defendant has provided 
no record material to support his allegations, and it is likely 
that the individuals identified by defendant were convicted of 
other lesser included offenses of theft. This Court should 
therefore refuse to consider defendant's apparent equal 
protection argument. See State v. Cook, 714 P.2d 296, 297 (Utah 
1986) (references to matters outside of the record are 
inappropriate and irrelevant and will not be considered). 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm the 
district court's denial of defendant's petition for post-
conviction relief. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this [fr day of October, 1992. 
ley General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the 
foregoing Brief was mailed, postage pre-paid, to Leslie C. 
Anderson, attorney pro se, Box 250, Draper, Utah, 84020, on this 
day of October, 1992. <2«ftV 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
wc-
F I L E D 
DLC.191989 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS Qj^/l^UOy^-^' 
__._ooooo—— % < y '•**• *"* •* Ccjn 
State of Utah, ) 
) MEMORANDUM DECISION 
* l a i n t U i « * Hespon&ent, > tt&ot iox ?sfo\ferttofb) 
) 
v. > 
) Case No. 890218-CA 
Leslie C. Anderson, ) 
) 
Defendant and Appellant. ) 
Before Judges Orme, Davidson, and Garff. 
PER CURIAM: 
Defendant appeals his conviction of theft, a second 
degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 
(1978). He appeals, claiming he was denied effective 
assistance of counsel and his rights of due process. We 
affirm. 
At arraignment, defendant requested to act as his own 
attorney but requested the court to appoint an attorney as 
co-counsel. The court appointed an attorney and the case 
proceeded to trial. On the day of trial, the court advised 
defendant he would have to wear a leg brace under his pants as 
a security measure against escape. Defendant refused. 
Defendant then attempted to fire his attorney, and the court 
denied his request. Subsequently, the court granted 
defendant's request for a continuance. Defendant again refused 
to wear a leg brace. The court barred him from the courtroom, 
informed him he could return if he wore the leg brace and 
permitted him to watch the trial on closed circuit television 
in an adjoining room. 
Defendant argues he was denied effective assistance of 
counsel because he was removed from the courtroom and not 
permitted to a c t a s co-counsel. Although defendants have a 
right to act as their own counsel, their self-representation 
may be terminated if they engage in serious and obstructionist 
misconduct. Faretta v. California. 422 U.S. 806, 834 n.46 
(1975). In addition, trial courts are granted considerable 
discretion it barring defendants from the courtroom for 
disruptive behavior. Illinois v. Allen. 397 U.S. 337, 343 
(1970). Further* to prove ineffective assistance of counsel, 
defendant must demonstrate specific acts or omissions which 
fall outside the wide range of professionally competent 
assistance. State v. Gardner. 101 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 12 (1989). 
The record clearly indicates that defendant used abusive 
language towards the court and counsel and was uncooperative. 
Under the circumstances, the court was well within its 
discretion in banning him from the courtroom, and defendant 
cannot complain about his self-caused inability to assist in 
his defense. Further* defendant has made no claim that trial 
counsel's representation was insufficient. We therefore find 
that defendant was not denied ineffective assistance of 
counsel. 
Defendant also asserts that he was denied due process by 
the court's decision to make him wear a leg brace. We hold 
that the trial court acted within its discretion in ordering 
defendant to wear the leg brace under his pants at trial. See 
Illinois v. Allen. 397 U.S. 337 (1970); State v. Harding. 137 
arit. 278* 670 P.2d 383 (1983)* £££&. d£ni£&* 465 U.S. 1013 
(1984) (no abuse of discretion in shackling defendant at trial 
where he had threatened counsel with bodily harm). 
2 
•ADDENDUM B 
f HED IN CLERK'S OFFiCE 
DAVIS ?pi!VTv •;-,.«> 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH, 
vs 
LESLIE 
Plaintiff, 
i 
CLARK ANDERSON, 
Defendant. 
IN AND 
OF DAVIS 
FOR THE 
1, STATE OF UTAH 
) RULING 
rco ti i JLU in JL 
CLERL2.- :i;:?.-.C:-JK? 
BY & 
DEPUTY CLERK 
ON MOTION TO 
) MODIFY JUDGMENT 
) Case No. 881706177 
The defendant has filed a motion to modify judgment. The 
defendant is appearing pro se. The State is represented by 
Carvel R. Harvard. Both parties have filed briefs. 
The defendant claims he should have been convicted of a 
third degree felony, instead of a second degree felony. 
The information charged the defendant with theft of a motor 
vehicle in violation of U.C.A. 76-6*404. The defendant was 
tried by a jury and convicted. Thereafter he appealed to the 
Utah Court of Appeals and the trial court was affirmed. 
The motion is without merit. U.C.A. 76-6-404 makes it a 
crime to commit theft. U.C.A. 76-6-412(1)(a)(ii) designates 
theft of an operable motor vehicle as a felony of the second 
degree. Jury instruction number 11 specifically required the 
jury to find the defendant "Knowingly or intentionally" 
"obtained or exercised unauthorized control over an operable 
motor vehicle" and that the defendant "had a purpose to deprive 
Stephen Bown of said vehicle." 
The motion to modify judgment is denied. 
Dated February 27, 1992. 
BY THE COURT: 
Certificate of Mailing: 
This is to certify that the undersigned nailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Ruling to: 
Carvel Harvard Leslie C. Anderson 
Davis County Attorney Office c/o Utah State Prison 
Farmington, Utah 84025 P. O. Box 250 
0 f Draper, Utah 84020 
Dated the ^l*h day of February 1992. 
Deputy Cl^rk 
ADDENDUM C 
INSTRUCTION NO. f± 
Before you can convict the defendant of Theft, second 
degree felony, as charged in the Information, you must find from 
the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt/^aDt of the following 
elements of the crime: 
r 
1. That the defendant, Leslie C. Anderson, obtained or
 /)C 
exercised unauthorized control over an operable motor vehicle 
belonging to Stephen Bovn, and 
2. That the defendant had a purpose to deprive Stephen, 
Bovn of said vehicle, and 
3. Defendant acted knowingly or intentionally, and /( 
4. That the defendant committed such acts on or about 
September 28, 1988 through October 11, 1988, at Davis County, /^ 
Utah. 
If you find each of the above elements proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt, it is your duty to find the defendant guilty of 
theft as charged in the Information; however, if you are not 
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of each and every one of the 
foregoing elements, you should then consider the lesser included 
offense of Unlawful Control Over a Vehicle• 
ADDENDUM D 
INSTRUCTION NO, )¥ 
Before you can convict the defendant of Unlawful 
Control Over a Vehicle, a lesser included offense, you must find 
from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, all of the following 
elements of the crime: 
1. That the defendant, Leslie C. Anderson, exercised 
unauthorized control over a vehicle belonging to Stephen Bown, 
and 
2. That the defendant exercised such control over the 
vehicle without the consent of either the owner or the lawful 
custodian of the vehicle, and 
3. That the defendant did the foregoing knowingly or 
intentionally and with an intent to temporarily d_eprive the owner 
or lawful custodian of possession of the vehicle, and 
4. That the defendant did not return the vehicle to 
the owner or lawful custodian within 24 hours after the exercise 
of unauthorized control, and 
5. That the defendant committed such acts on or about 
September 28, 1988 through October 11, 1988, at Davis County, 
Utah. 
If you find each of the above elements proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt, it is your duty to find the defendant guilty; 
however, if the State has failed to prove each and every one of 
the above elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it is your duty to 
find the defendant not guilty* 
